The preponderance of independent expert opinion views the Act's wording as dangerously vague, overly-broad, inviting racial and religious screening by state authorities. 5 Such issues came before the courts for the first time by way of preliminary motion in criminal proceedings. The adage that hard facts make bad law is called to mind by the case as Mr. Mohammad Momin Khawaja stands accused of truly heinous crimes. The allegations against him are such as to render him an unlikely candidate for judicial sympathy. In R v. Khawaja 6 Mr. Justice Rutherford had to determine whether the ATA's provisions dealing with the financing, participating, facilitating, instructing and harbouring of terrorism or terrorist activities were unconstitutional on account of over-breadth or vagueness. Widely perceived "as a strong law-and-order judge who's tough on crime," Mr. Justice Rutherford surprised at least some observers 7 when he concluded that Canada's legislated definition of "terrorist activity" was unconstitutional to the extent that it required "proof that a person was motivated by ideological, religious or political purpose in the activity for which they've been charged." Mr. Justice Rutherford stressed his unease with a "procedure whereby a single, appointed judge of a seriously under-resourced trial court is asked to review and declare provisions of federal legislation recently enacted to deal with a most pressing problem to be unconstitutional on the basis only of written opinions without a specific factual foundation or expert evidence on which to base such a finding." 9 Prudent judges hesitate to reach too far and Mr. Justice Rutherford's ruling is, unsurprisingly, notable 5 In addition to the sources cited in the Khawaja ruling, see, for example: Mark Burgess, "Terrorism: 
causes substantial property damage, whether to public or private property, if causing such damage is likely to result in the conduct or harm referred to in any of clauses (A) to (C), or (E) causes serious interference with or serious disruption of an essential service, facility or system, whether public or private, other than as a result of advocacy, protest, dissent or stoppage of work that is not intended to result in the conduct or harm referred to in any of clauses (A) to (C), (1.1) For greater certainty, the expression of a political, religious or ideological thought, belief or opinion does not come within paragraph (b) of the definition "terrorist activity" in subsection (1) unless it constitutes an act or omission that satisfies the criteria of that paragraph.
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Although the nature of the proceedings meant that Rutherford J. lacked the benefit of either "specific factual foundation or expert evidence," 22 he approached the matter carefully and fully, engaging in a thorough survey of both scholarly literature and comparative anti-terrorism legislation. His frame of reference here was the real world of police work, intelligence gathering, imperfect information, and human interactions. The "motive" clause was ruled unconstitutional because it does nothing to enhance the effectiveness of state authorities in counter-terrorist work, and yet it produces an increased likelihood of inappropriate targeting of minority groups "through racial or ethnic profiling and prejudice." 23 The net result in this aspect is that "the Crown now has one less element of the criminal offence which it has to prove beyond a reasonable doubt."
24

Overbreadth and Vagueness
Secondly, the court considered Khawaja's argument that the Anti-Terrorism provisions as a whole are so ill-defined, vague, and over-broad as to be unconstitutional in toto. Although it is pervasively imprecise, Mr. Justice Rutherford held that the overall legislative scheme passes constitutional muster.
The two portions of Rutherford J.'s ruling sit uneasily together, yet each is logically developed, faithful to authority, and thoughtful on its own terms. The inconsistency within the ruling points to a fundamental incoherence in the substrata of Canadian constitutional law. Whereas the courts focus much on social facts in certain "Charter" areas, they tend to remain resolutely formalist and highly deferential to Parliament in other fields. Mr. Justice Rutherford's ruling breaks on this fault line. His approach to the constitutionality of the "motive" element in terrorism offences reflects a deep concern with how law actually works in real life. This portion of the ruling is concerned with law "in action," with real life. It focuses, not on words on paper or on how they might be constitutionally construed in the rarefied atmosphere of superior courts, but with the daily rituals of implementation that play themselves out as state bureaucrats, security officials, police officers, and investigators interact with each other and with those subject to their power on a day-to-day basis. If police and security officials are told to look for religious or political motivations as part of the definition of crimes, their inclination to focus disproportionate attention on minority religious or political groups will be accentuated. The presumed context of social interactions, of the micro-physics of power, is front-and-centre of Mr. Justice Rutherford's reasoning.
When it comes to the inherent vagueness of the terrorism provisions in toto, however, the quotidian realm gives way to another. This alternative world is inhabited exclusively by learned lawyers, Superior Court justices, and the sort of well-meaning, well-informed, state officials who read obscure constitutional law treatises in their spare time, who contemplate the finer points of the Oakes 25 test in quiet moments -and who understand it. The beat cop in this world has legal learning on par with Superior Court Justices, the patience of Job, and the wisdom of Solomon. In stark contrast to his ruling on the "motivation" provisions, the possibility that state officials might be insufficiently guided or even lead astray by poorly chosen statutory language is not treated as a serious possibility in this domain. The focus here is the courtroom where judges are able to insist upon constitutional constructions of words that admit freely of many other alternatives. Any sense of "law in action" is gone. The fundamental legal realist appreciation that many nasty things can occur without Superior Courts ever being called into action is entirely absent.
The cleavage between these two portions of the ruling is stark: a critically informed legal realism is met by an equal and opposite force. This inconsistency is the most noteworthy -and surely the most curious -feature of Mr. Justice Rutherford's ruling. It is forced upon him higher authority. The legal standards established by the Supreme Court of Canada on vagueness and overbreadth, allow for the creation of offences even by words so uncertain as to provide no meaningful guidance to persons subject to them. 26 In fact, a single-minded determination to find precision of meaning where the "plain language" reveals none is the only approach capable sustaining the Anti-Terrorism Act. This is a disturbing outcome because a system of government based on imprecise rules violates a fundamental principle of legality.
Canada's standard of constitutional vagueness is extremely low and irrationally court-focused. The test is only whether lawyers will be "able to debate the potential boundaries of the provisions in court."
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Lawyers, of course, are well able to debate most anything.
The Rule of Law
Although there is no explicit provision in Canada's written constitution requiring legislative clarity, something equivalent flows from the principle of the rule of law.
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At its core the vagueness doctrine seeks to ensure confidence that the laws governing Canadians "must meet a certain level of precision." 29 The rule of law, as Albert Venn Dicey famously observed, requires that no man is punishable or can be lawfully made to suffer in body or goods except for a distinct breach of law established in the ordinary legal manner before the ordinary Courts of the land. In this sense the rule of law is contrasted with every system of government based on the exercise by persons in authority of wide, arbitrary, or discretionary powers of constraint.
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The Supreme Court of Canada assigns the doctrine status as an interpretive principle to be applied to other Charter provisions, most notably sections 7 and 1.
Section 7 guarantees the right to "life, liberty and security of the person and the right not to be deprived thereof except in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice."
Section 1 provides that all of the Charter's rights and freedoms are subject "only to such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society." 31 Imprecision of statutory wording is addressed in the first place by means of canons of statutory interpretation (classically, the principle that penal statutes are strictly construed) and constitutional law as such becomes relevant when ordinary interpretive principles prove insufficient. The vagueness doctrine comes into play when a statute that violates the Charter fails to find justification under s.1 because it so imprecise as to fail to amount to a "limit prescribed by law." Imprecision can also lead to unconstitutional overbreadth violating the required proportionality between rights infringement and legislative objectives.
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The principles at stake here are both simple and important. It is important not to lose sight of them as the complexities inherent in their working-out are encountered. Clarity in law-making is required in order to provide fair notice to those subject to the law and to limit the arbitrary exercise of power by state officials. The rule of law seeks restraints on the discretion of law enforcement in order to constrain human bias, to ensure the "even-handedness in the administration of justice" and, consequently, to reduce the arbitrary application of power.
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In R. v. Nova Scotia Pharmaceutical Society 34 the Supreme Court of Canada articulated the modern doctrine of overbreadth and vagueness. The Court held that offences must be defined through statute rather than by judges (anything else amounts to ex post facto law-making) and that statutes must have some limits in scope. So far, so good. In Pharmaceutical Society, the Court zeroed in on the absolute legal dimensions of "fair notice." In doing so the court unfortunately qualified the seemingly clear principles it had articulated. The principles were lost entirely in encountering complexities in application. It was not, the court said, necessary for individuals to actually know the law -or, it might be said, have the capacity to learn it -provided only that they could subjectively understand that their conduct is regulated by law in a way that is consistent with the "substratum of values" in Canadian society:
The substantive aspect of fair notice is therefore a subjective understanding that the law touches upon some conduct, based on the substratum of values underlying the legal enactment and on the role that the legal enactment plays in the life of the society… I do not wish to suggest that the State can only intervene through law when some non-legal basis for intervention exists. Many enactments are relatively narrow in scope and echo little of society at large; this is the case with many regulatory enactments. The weakness or the absence of substantive [page635] notice before the enactment can be compensated by bringing to the attention of the public the actual terms of the law, so that substantive notice will be achieved….. A certain connection between the formal and substantive aspects of fair notice can be seen here. Fair notice may not have been given when enactments are in somewhat general terms, in a way that does not readily permit citizens to be aware of their substance, when they do not relate to any element of the substratum of values held by society. It is no coincidence that these enactments are often found vague.
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In other words, imprecise prohibitions could be sustained if connection with Canada's "substratum of values" would be clear to any non-lawyer ("it's disapproved; I should assume its illegal") or if the fair notice concerns have been met by publicity campaigns prior to any law enforcement. 36 Gonthier J. declined to consider hypothetical scenarios arising from vague wording, stating that a law should "only be declared unconstitutionally vague where a court has embarked upon the interpretive process, but has concluded that interpretation is not possible." and ordinary sense harmoniously with the scheme of the Act, the object of the Act, and the intention of Parliament."
41 This is an approach that is explicitly designed to minimize the alleged overbreadth in question. There is also the presumption that a provision should be read constitutionally -that is, that Parliament had intended to enact legislative provisions that are not unconstitutional. 42 This general presumption can also be extended to mean that the use of "broad and general terms in legislation may be justified. In identifying what they wish to legislate against, legislators cannot be expected to identify every variation of the factual situations they envisage." goes on to determine that the judiciary "is expected to determine whether legislation applies in particular fact situations." She notes the Supreme Court of Canada's decision in R. v. Sharpe, supra, the majority determined that a purposive approach to the child pornography legislation appeared to exclude many of the alleged examples of its overbreadth, finding, for example that works aimed at describing various aspects of life that incidentally touched on illegal acts with children were unlikely to be caught by the provision."
and the officials who must enforce it. The two are interconnected. A vague law prevents the citizen from realizing when he or she is entering an area of risk for criminal sanction. It similarly makes it difficult for law enforcement officers and judges to determine whether a crime has been committed. This invokes the further concern of putting too much discretion in the hands of law enforcement officials, and violates the precept that individuals should be governed by the rule of law, not the rule of persons. The doctrine of vagueness is directed generally at the evil of leaving "basic policy matters to policemen, judges, and juries for resolution on an ad hoc and subjective basis, with the attendant dangers of arbitrary and discriminatory application."
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The Court's concern respecting vagueness is thus directed to fair notice to those subject to the law on one hand and the limitation of arbitrary power on the other. More generally, the Court sought to strike a balance between executive or administrative flexibility and the rule of law. No one can fault the principles here.
But the actual outcome reached by the Supreme Court of Canada sets a very high threshold for "vagueness" or, conversely, a very low threshold for rule of law values.
The doctrine's basis -the need to provide "fair notice" to those individuals whose conduct may be regulated by law and placing limits on law enforcement officials' discretion -has been fatally undermined by a formulation that puts court interpretation in front of social life. This ensures that, in the ordinary course of events, enormously vague and unconstrained powers will be exercised by officials, invisibly to the courts, 
Application in Khawaja
Because Khawaja's application was presented without the benefit of having heard evidence, 47 his counsel, Edward Greenspon, made several hypothetical arguments pointing to the ways in which individuals entirely lacking in moral culpability for anything approaching terrorist acts could nonetheless find themselves in contravention of the ATA's prohibition on facilitating terrorist groups: even the term "facilitate" itself was said to be vague and over-broad.
48
Greenspon specifically criticized s. 83.01(1)(b), arguing that existing federal laws in the Criminal Code of Canada were "broad enough to catch and provide for prosecution of virtually all of the terrorist acts" foreseen by the ATA. 49 He criticized the breadth of clause 83.01(1) (b) (i) (A), that the act be committed, "in whole or in part for a political, religious or ideological purpose, objective or cause," and again for the use of "in whole or in part" in 83.01(1) (b)(i)(B), arguing that virtually any act will be at least in some part for such purposes, and that a partial intention, no matter how small, is inadequate to circumscribe the area of risk and leaves the legislation excessively broad.
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Essentially, he argued that the ATA provisions were too broad and too vague to be considered constitutional. Pacific Ltd. he declined to entertain "hypothetical circumstances that test the periphery of a legislated prohibition," holding that the clear identification and application to a "core of misconduct" is all that is relevant.
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The conclusion is reached that conduct described with the use of terms such as "in whole or in part", "directly or indirectly", "serious", and "substantial" are not Here too, he declined to entertain the hypothetical examples offered by Khawaja's counsel, opting for a case-by-case application of the "absurdity principle" in dealing with situations where the accused might be considered a terrorist group unto himself, for example. 59 Such an application, of course, does little to prevent law-enforcement officials from continuing to charge individuals in such cases, and nothing to constrain intrusive police or official actions conducted in the shadow of the law. This presents a jarring contrast with Mr. Justice Rutherford's approach to the "motivation" portion of the Anti-Terrorism Act. In the final analysis, and within the particular constraints of a preliminary motion his Lordship accepted that the current legislation contains sufficient clarity to meet the fundamental constitutional requirement that people not be convicted of crimes (including terrorist crimes) unless they "intended" wrong-doing. 
Conclusion
Although the Act was upheld on its first courtroom test, the outcome is not a satisfactory one from the perspective of Canadian government principles. Many portions of the Anti-Terrorism Act have an Alice-in-Wonderland character. To take just one example, a person is said to "knowingly" facilitate terrorist activity even if:
1. the facilitator does not know whether any particular terrorist activity "is facilitated," 2. no terrorist activity "was foreseen or planned", and 3. no terrorist activity "was actually carried out." (s. 83.19 (1)).
There is little doubt that Ottawa's draftspersons are good enough to do better than this if they set their minds to it.
Rights are affected powerfully by police, security officials, immigration officials, and others in many, many circumstances that never come before the courts. While
Canadians wait for a decision on the Defense's request for a Leave to Appeal and a government request for a cross-appeal, Parliament has thus far not seen the need to clarify any provisions of the ATA 62 . With respect, there is an enormous difference between recognizing the impossibility of drafting statutory language that allows of no ambiguity and a judicial approach to statutory interpretation that encourages sloppy 61 Ibid. In the end, Khawaja's appeal was dismissed by the Supreme Court of Canada.
(http://www.canada.com/nationalpost/news/story.html?id=de427053-4c81-4c2c-b40d-8c028d2cc227&k=65686 62 Two of the Criminal Code provisions enacted by the ATA, the investigative hearing and recognizance with conditions (know as the preventive arrest provision) powers were scheduled to sunset on March 1, 2007. Prime Minister's Stephen Harper's minority Conservative government attempted to extend the provisions for another three years, but the attempt failed due to opposition by the Liberals, NDP and Bloc Quebecois. In February 2007, the Supreme Court of Canada ruled that Security Certificate provisions, used to indefinitely detain individuals deemed a threat to national security, were invalid. The government has since proposed to modify the security certificate regime by adding a 'special advocate' mandated to represent the interests of the person held under a security certificate, who would have access to the secret evidence but could not communicate with the person involved. In May 2007, the government also appealed a Federal Court decision ordering it to hand over 73 documents as well as summaries of information contained in more than 400 other documents to Khawaja's lawyers. In October 2007, the Federal Court of Appeal ruled partially in the government's favour by allowing a revised schedule of document summaries to be produced.
draftspersonship. One can hope that the Supreme Court of Canada will revise its vagueness and overbreadth doctrines to bring their operations more fully into compliance with the principles that generate such doctrines in the first place. Parliament too has responsibilities, however, as the principle trustee for Canadian constitutionalism.
Since the Charter came into place, politicians have often elected to avoid controversial and difficult matters by leaving it to the courts to work things out. It is, however, Parliament's job to define standards clearly, citizens' right to expect that, and the obligation of the Courts to insist upon it.
Canada's Parliament has let Canadians down badly by failing to provide clear direction to either citizens or security officials under our Anti-Terrorism legislation.
Despite the unattractive biography of Momin Khawaja, Mr. Justice Rutherford's ruling in this case points to the need to reassess Anti-Terrorism legislation from a perspective informed by an appreciation and understanding of the Rule of Law. This transcends party politics and has nothing to do with being "soft on terrorists". A review that starts from fundamentals is needed and Parliament should have the courage to lead it.
